Evaluation and identification of process hazards of Utility unit of fifth refinery of South Pars gas complex using HAZOP technique

Number of pages: 161 File Format: word File Code: 30525
Year: 2016 University Degree: Master's degree Category: Chemical - Petrochemical Engineering
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    Dissertation for Master's Degree in Chemical Engineering

    Today, creating a safe environment in which all harmful factors are identified, evaluated, eliminated or controlled to ensure the health of people and facilities is one of the priorities of industrial management. Safety science has also been reactive like the traditional approach to safety, that is, managers did not think of finding problems and fixing them until accidents occurred. In recent decades, the conscientious and moral considerations of industrial owners, along with legal requirements and insurance obligations, have placed attention on safety science in a special place. In the meantime, the great impact of safety on profitability and increasing competition with colleagues should not be neglected. Therefore, attention to safety with a preventive attitude towards accidents, especially in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries, which have a high potential to cause human and environmental accidents, has become the focus of attention. Gas refineries are considered one of the most important parts of this industry, and the need to increase safety in these parts is one of the most important issues for everyone's attention because the smallest problem in this industry, in addition to huge environmental and human disasters, may impose irreparable economic problems on the country.

    Several methods are used to increase current processes in gas industries, of which risk study and process management [1] are one. It is one of the best methods. The use of this method is a requirement in industrialized countries. The implementation of this system is highly recommended in developing countries and is used in many oil, gas and petrochemical industries. The implementation of the HAZOP system in Iran's refineries in order to increase the safety of the systems has become one of the most important tasks that can be done in these factories and is used in many industries related to oil, gas and petrochemicals.

    The works carried out in these industries include the HAZOP study and risk assessment for the urea unit of Shiraz Petrochemical Complex, the sweetening units of Razi Petrochemical Complex, the ethylene oxide production unit of Arak Petrochemical Complex, UCF Isfahan fluor production unit, sodium bicarbonate units of Shiraz Petrochemical Complex, LPG recycling unit of Kangan Gas Refinery, polystyrene production unit of Tabriz Petrochemical, upstream units of Dehran and Danan region, desalination unit of Mobin Petrochemical and Izomax unit of Bandar Abbas Oil Refining Company. Of course, the activities carried out in this field are many and progressing, and every day more units of the petrochemical complex are subjected to this study [1]. Considering that more than 5 years have passed since the installation and operation of this unit, while there are no available HAZOP studies in the Utility unit, and after the operation of the unit, hazard identification studies have not been conducted through HAZOP studies.

    2. The high volume of investment along with the importance of the strategic dimension of continuous and continuous fuel and energy supply requires the identification of risky factors and factors that reduce the production rate or disturb the quality of the product and take the necessary measures to eliminate them.

    3. Government centers and individuals always show resistance to changes. Providing scientific, documented and reasoned solutions through a group of experts and experts with the help of the experiences of the complex's own personnel paves the way to improve the safety and operational level of the system as quickly as possible.

    The direct and indirect costs caused by accidents every year cause significant financial and life injuries to the country's industries, especially the gas refining industry due to the nature of the activities of this industry as one of the country's high-risk industries, so to prevent From the occurrence of such accidents, it is necessary to use a systematic method to identify hidden risks in industrial units and to continuously review them. Many managers and experts consider paying attention to safety issues to save time and money. Implementing safety programs in industrial units, identifying risk potentials and providing practical solutions to prevent and reduce injuries caused by accidents, can bring many benefits in terms of economy and optimal use of time.Among these advantages, the following can be mentioned:

    Reduction of costs related to:

    Destroying equipment

    Interruption in work

    Restarting and reaching uniformity in continuous processes

    Waste of materials

    Absence of injured employees in accidents

    Transportation and treatment of the injured

    Training of personnel New

    Increasing efficiency in the use of resources and consequently increasing the economic profitability of the company

    Increasing production efficiency

    Increasing the quality of products

    Showing the commitment of the organization's management towards safety and continuous improvement

    Increasing the credibility of the organization regarding compliance with the principles of occupational safety and health

    This thesis consists of 5 chapters, in the first chapter definitions related to safety and an overview of There are different conventional methods of hazard identification. In the second chapter, the HAZOP method is fully explained in accordance with the existing standards and in order to familiarize the readers and colleagues of the project. In the third chapter, the utility process of the fifth refinery of the South Pars gas complex is described in detail along with the description of the input section of the unit and their control topics. In the fourth chapter, the method of conducting HAZOP studies in the Utility Unit of the Fifth Refinery of the South Pars Gas Complex and the assumptions and considerations of the work are described, and in the fifth chapter, the conclusions and suggestions of the whole project are described in detail.

    Chapter 1 Introduction to safety and hazard identification methods

    1-1- History of safety in the industry[1 and 2]

    1-1-2- Health and the safety movement, from the past to Now

    For a long time, the need to improve safety was usually felt when the lack of safety led to situations with unfortunate social or economic consequences. The occurrence of accidents in industrial facilities and technological systems shows the necessity of continuing evolution in safety research in the field of safety standards, rooting events and accidents, modifying safety assessment methods and hazard recognition, the role of factors affecting safety. Usually, following the shock of an accident, the management of industrial facilities and technological systems decides to find the root of the factors causing the said unfortunate conditions. If these assessments are not done properly, the active root causes of accidents remain unchanged in the system, and on other occasions, in combination with specific operating conditions, hardware failures, human errors, and organizational deficiencies, another incident will emerge. Industry, agriculture, education, labor and government have expanded. Developments of the safety movement in America were concurrent and parallel to the National Safety Society (NSC). In the early 1900s, industrial accidents were common in this country; For example, in 1907 more than 3200 people died in mining accidents. At the same time, law, precedent, and public opinion were all against management. There were few protections for worker safety. Today's industrial workers are better off than their colleagues in the past. Industrial accidents kill less than half as many workers as their predecessors in the past 60 years. According to the NSC, the common death rate from work-related injuries is approximately 4 out of every 100,000 people, or less than one-third of what it was 50 years ago.

    Advances in safety have long been the result of pushing for legislation to promote health and safety, the continued rising costs of accidents and injuries, and the professionalization of safety as a profession. Future developments are likely to be as large as a result informing the cost impact and competitive advantage of a safe and healthy factory.

    A first aid kit or first aid supplies should be available, and the safety and health manager should seek a physician's opinion on their choice of materials. Unfortunately, medical professionals are reluctant to give such an opinion, perhaps because they are afraid of the subsequent conflict in the courts of law for incidents that occurred due to insufficient effective substances. Safety and health managers should do their best to obtain this opinion and then document what has been done.

    1-1-3- Early Safety Developments:

    It is important for new industrial safety and health trainees to begin their studies with a look back. Understanding the past can help health and safety professionals test in the past and in the future.

  • Contents & References of Evaluation and identification of process hazards of Utility unit of fifth refinery of South Pars gas complex using HAZOP technique

    List:

    Chapter One: An introduction to safety and hazard identification methods. 5

    1-1- History of safety in industry. 6

    1-1-2- Health and safety movement, from past to present. 6

    1-1-3- Basic safety improvements. 7

    1-1-4- Accidents and their effects in the industry. 8

    1-1-5- Expenses of accidents. 8

    1-2- An overview of huge industrial disasters in the past. 9

    1-2-1- The huge accident of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. 9

    1-2-2- Fire in the Petrochemical Complex of Pardis Ik Assalouye. 11

    1-2-3- France Ficin explosion: 11

    1-2-4- Fire and explosion in the North Sea oil production platform, Piper Alpha 11

    1-2-5- Bhopal incident in India. 12

    1-2-6- Explosion in Khark Petrochemical Complex. 12

    1-3 Definitions. 13

    1-3-1- Risk. 13

    1-3-2- Risk 13

    1-3-3- Event. 13

    1-3-4- accident. 14

    1-3-5- Safety. 14

    1-3-6-tolerable risk. 14

    1-4- Risk measurement criteria. 14

    1-4-1- Risk index. 14

    1-4-2- Average severity of losses. 15

    1-4-3- Personal risk. 15

    1-4-4- collective risk. 15

    1-5- Risk assessment. 15

    1-6- Risk identification. 16

    1-6-1- safety review. 17

    1-6-2-checklist analysis. 18

    1-6-3- Question analysis. 18

    1-6-4- Analysis of materials in the process and critical conditions. 19

    1-6-5-Preliminary risk analysis (PHA) 19

    1-6-6- Hazard study and management (HAZOP) 20

    1-6-7- Risk analysis. 20

    1-6-8- Analysis of defects and effects. 21

    1-7- Consequence modeling. 21

    1-9- Calculation of risk. 22

    1-9-1- F-N curve 22

    1-9-2- Risk acceptance criteria. 24

    1-10- Risk reduction. 25

    1-11- Conclusion. 26

    Chapter Two: Risk Analysis and System Management. 28

    2-1- Introduction. 29

    2-2- Definition of HAZOP. 29

    2-3- The reasons for the widespread use of the HAZOP method. 29

    2-4- Description of activities in the HAZOP method. 30

    2-5- Start-up information 30

    2-6- HAZOP steps. 31

    2-7- HAZOP group. 31

    2-8- HAZOP table. 34

    2-8-1- HAZOP table entries. 35

    2-9- Application software and reasons for using them. 38

    2-10- Major disadvantages of the HAZOP method. 40

    2-11- Risk matrix. 40

    2-12 - Mathematical model integration as a suggested solution to improve the disadvantages of the HAZOP method. 42

    2-13- Conclusion: 42

    Chapter 3: general understanding of the utility unit of South Gazpars complex. 44

    3-1- Introduction. 45

    3-1-1- South Pars Gas Complex Company: 46

    3-2-1- Unit 100: flood trap, receiving equipment and HP separator 47

    3-2-2- Unit 101: Gas sweetening 49

    3-2-3- Unit 102: Glycol recovery. 49

    3-2-4- Unit 103: stabilization of gas condensate. 50

    3-2-5- Unit 104: Dehumidification and removal of mercury 50

    3-2-6- Unit 105: Ethane recycling. 51

    3-2-7- Unit 106: Gas export 52

    3-2-8- Unit 107: Liquid gas separation. 53

    3-2-9- Unit 108: Sulfur recycling. 53

    3-2-9-1- Clause stage 54

    3-2-9-2- Degassing stage. 54

    3-2-9-3- Incinerator 55

    3-2-10- Unit 109: Separation of acid gases and hydrocarbons from water. 55

    3-2-11- Unit 110: Support unit 103. 56

    3-2-12-Unit 111: Propane cooling 56

    3-2-13- Unit 113: Caustic regeneration. 57

    3-2-14- Unit 114: Propane processing. 58

    3-2-15- Unit 115: Butane processing. 59

    3-2-16- Unit 116: Ethane processing. 59

    3-2-16-1- Absorber section 60

    3-2-16-2- Regeneration section 60

    3-2-16-3-Dehydration section 60

    3-2-17- Unit 121: Steam production. 61

    3-2-18- Unit 122: Fuel gas 62

    3-2-19- Unit 123: Air production of precision instruments. 63

    3-2-20- Unit 124: Nitrogen production. 64

    3-2-21- Unit 125: Water supply. 65

    3-2-22- Unit 126: Water desalination. 66

    3-2-23- Unit 127: Production of water without solvents. 67

    3-2-24- Unit 128: Production of potable water 67

    3-2-25- Unit 129: Industrial wastewater treatment. 68

    3-2-25-1- Treatment of oily water and hydrocarbons68

    3-2-25-1- Treatment of oily water and hydrocarbons 68

    3-2-25-2- Treatment of chemical water. 68

    3-2-25-3- Treatment of human sewage. 69

    3-2-26- Unit 130: Fire fighting water. 70

    3-2-27- Unit 131: Fuel supply for diesel consumers. 71

    3-2-28- Unit 132: Water cooler. 71

    3-2-29- Unit 140: Flares 72

    3-2-30- Unit 141: Drain tank. 72

    3-2-31- Unit 142: Burn Pit 73

    3-2-32- Unit 143: Gas condensate tanks. 73

    3-2-33- Unit 144: Sulfur solidification. 74

    3-2-34- Unit 145: Propane storage for cooling. 74

    3-2-35- Unit 146: Storage of chemicals. 74

    3-2-36- Unit 147: Export propane storage. 75

    3-2-37- Unit 148: Butane export storage. 76

    Chapter 4: HAZOP studies of the Utility Unit of the Fifth Refinery of South Pars Gas Complex. 77

    4-1- Introduction. 78

    4-2- Documents of HAZOP studies of Utility Unit of the fifth refinery. 79

    4-2-1- HAZOP team members. 79

    4-2-2- The list of map numbers used in HAZOP. 79

    4-2-3- List of nodes 80

    4-2-4- Checking deviations in each node 83

    4-2-5- HAZOP tables: includes all finalized tables. (Worksheet) 83

    4-2-5-1- Interpretation of Table A-61-Reduction/interruption of flow in the sea water inlet system to tank 101. 84

    4-2-6- List of proposals presented in HAZOP meetings. 85

    4-3- Assumptions and considerations in conducting HAZOP studies. 85

    4-4- Effective solutions to reduce risk in the Fifth Refinery Utility Unit. 86

    4-4-1- Personal protective equipment. 86

    4-4-2- Process materials. 86

    4-4-3- Labor health 87

    4-4-4- Accidents. 87

    4-4-5- Education. 87

    4-4-6- Repairs and maintenance. 87

    4-4-7- Process. 88

    4-4-8- Safety. 88

    4-4-9- Management. 88

    4-5- Conclusion. 88

    Chapter: Fifth conclusion and suggestions. 89

    5-1- Introduction. 90

    5-2- General suggestions. 90

    5-3- The results of hazard and management study (HAZOP) 91

    5-3-1- Hardware suggestions. 92

    5-3-2- Guideline suggestions and recommendations 95

    5-3-3- Study and research suggestions. 97

    5-4- Suggestions for future works 97

    References. 98

    Appendices 101

    Appendix (A): HAZOP documents. 102

    Appendix (b): The knotting done on the p&id maps of the Fifth Refinery Utility Unit. 132

    Appendix (c): HSE questionnaire. 139

     

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Evaluation and identification of process hazards of Utility unit of fifth refinery of South Pars gas complex using HAZOP technique